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I

ENVIRONMENTAL
"REMEDIATION"

EXPENSES AND A
NATURAL

INTERPRETATION OF

THE CAPITALIZATION

REQUIREMENT
THEODORE S. SIMS*

tion the land was in before mining operations commenced. Based on its experience, it can estimate with reasonably
accuracy (1) when it will cease its mining
operations, and (2) how much it will

INTRODUCTION

The income taxation of outlays for envicost to reclaim the land.
ronmental restoration (or "remediation'')

has become a hot topic once again. It
elicited extensive consideration a decade

How should the anticipated reclamation
costs be taxed? There is no dispute
about whether they are deductible. The
controversy is about when, and there
are two basic possibilities. One is to al-

ago, when the focus was on the treatment of expenses of surface mining reclamation and nuclear power plant decommissioning, now explicitly covered by low a deduction where the reclamation
Sections 468 and 468A of the Internal

costs are actually paid. Equivalently, one

Revenue Code. As a formal matter,
those specific matters are just examples,
conspicuous by their size, of the more
general question of how an income tax

could discount the entire future cost to

should account for "future costs." Al-

further deduction at any other time. I

its present value, using an after-tax discount rate, and allow a deduction in

that discounted amount now, but no

though not currently controversial, sur- will refer to these approaches as "cash"
face mining affords a simple illustration. (or "cash-equivalent") accounting for fuAs a condition of mining coal by surfaceture costs.1

methods, a coal mine operator is uncon-

The basic alternative is some form of

ditionally required by state law to restore
"accrual." In the literature, the accrual
its site, when no longer actively mined,
approaches are described in a variety of
to a reasonable facsimile of the condiways, and justified by appeal to a variety
*National Law Center, George Washington University, Wash- of analogies, but they are similar in both

provenance and operational content.2

ington, D.C. 20052.
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distinction between the treatment of

Operationally, they all allow the present
value of the liability - determined using

"ordinary and necessary" future ex-

penses and future "capital" costs. It also

a pretax discount rate - to be deducted
when the liability first becomes fixed and
reasonably determinable, and thereafter
to allow the balance of the liability to be
deducted over time as it accrues.3 All of

helps to identify more precisely the

methodological divide between proponents of accrual and those (presumably
including Congress) who claim that cash
equivalent accounting is theoretically
correct. In particular, it suggests that
there will always be tax invariant solutions to the problem of future costs;
that they all can be accounted for within

them have some kinship to Samuelson's
(1964) article on "economic" depreciation.

This fundamental underlying question is
not, it should immediately be said, the
source of current controversy. The work

the framework of Samuelson's solution

to the problem of determining "economic" depreciation; but that they all
will have the property of apparently requiring a zero rate of tax.

ten years ago (and since) has not produced agreement on how this problem
properly should be solved. As the result
of legislation largely enacted with the
Tax Reform Act of 1984, however, the
basic issues have been by and large resolved. The statute now leans heavily in
the direction of cash-equivalent accounting.4 To capture the flavor of the current
controversy, one might add to the sur-

Thereafter, I will turn briefly to the matters of current interest, which I think
should be somewhat less difficult to resolve.
ECONOMIC DEPRECIATION

An Outlay for a Net Revenue Stream

face mining hypothetical the further
fact, not anticipated when mining oper-

Theory

ations were begun, that those opera-

As the result of Samuelson's (1964) paper, it is now widely understood, not
only by economists but by lawyers
preoccupied with income tax policy, that

tions caused serious environmental con-

taminants to leach into the surrounding
soil, adding to the cost of restoration.5
Nevertheless, in this paper I wish to re-

asset values are invariant to their hold-

visit the underlying issue, for I think

ers' tax rates - which I shall henceforth

there may be more that can be said.
Specifically, I think that Samuelson's

denote by "tax invariant," or simply "invariant" - if and only if asset depreciation is economic. Specifically, Samuelson
began by representing with the Fisher
integral the value V(t) of an asset that

original article, typically illustrated using

simple discrete time examples, actually
speaks not merely to the problem of asset "depreciation" conventionally understood, but more generally to the deductibility of expenses and, in principle at
least, to the equally fundamental matter
of "capitalization." Thus, in what follows, I introduce a modification into

produces a continuous net revenue
stream N(t), known with certainty in advance, in an environment in which the
pretax interest rate is y:6

D

Samuelson's original analysis that takes
explicit account, not merely of the depreciation of an initial investment, but
also of subsequently incurred expenses.

V(t) = e* Ms) e"" ds.
Js=t

The time derivative of equation 1 is
given by:

This treatment has the virtue of clarify-

ing (at least in principle) the confusing
704
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The significance of the second term of
equation 4, -yV(t), becomes clear if
equation 4 is substituted into equation 3
to obtain the actual tax-rate-invariant

I /'(f) = yV(t) - N(t).

The taxable counterpart to equation 1,
with tax imposed at rate z and depreciation allowed in computing taxable income at a rate (possibly) dependent on
the marginal tax rate, and therefore denoted D(t,z), is

expression for V(t):

a
V(t,z) = V(t) = e^-'" {N(s)
Js=t

B

- zyV(s)} e~^~z)s ds.

V(t,z) = e^~z)t {N(s)

The important feature of equation 5 is
that, when economic depreciation is allowed, the only thing that is taxed is the
instantaneous accrual of yield (at rate y)
to the net value [V(t)] of the asset itself.
Thus, while most of the attention has

J s-t

z[N(s) - D(s,z)]} e"y(1_z)s ds.

Samuelson (1964) showed that equation
3 is tax-rate invariant if and only if

been devoted to the allowance of eco-

nomic depreciation, the equally fundamental implication of allowing economic
depreciation is that it leads to the taxation of just yV(t). In other words, economic depreciation implements a pure

a
D(t,z) = m
= N(t) - yV(t)
= ~V'(t)

accrual tax.7

An example

that is, only if the depreciation allow-

ance is equal to the change in the asset's value, given by the negative of its
time derivative V'(t).

Before proceeding further, it is worth
turning to a simple illustration, used by

The decomposition of the depreciation
schedule, equation 4, merits careful attention. It says that, for an investor who
receives an (includible) net receipt N(t) at
time t, a principal element of the depreciation allowance is a deduction equal to
the amount of the receipt. The intuition
underlying this feature of the schedule is
that two things occur simultaneously at

Sunley (1984), and elaborated on in detail by Fiekowsky (1984) and Cunningham (1985), in exploring the taxation of a "negative salvage value" asset,
one that requires an extraordinary outlay
at the close of the asset's service life.

First, however, I consider the asset in the

absence of the final outlay, assuming
that it has five years of constant productivity, generating annual net income of
$1,000, in an environment with a ten
time t : one is that the investor is enpercent pretax discount rate and a 30
riched by the amount of the receipt; the
percent tax rate. If acquired for $3,791,
other, however, is that the stream of rethe asset's internal rate of return equals
maining receipts to which ownership of
the pretax discount rate (and its net
the asset entitles the investor declines by
present value is zero).
an exactly offsetting amount. Hence, her
The standard treatment of that asset, if
net worth is unaffected by the mere
conversion into cash of her claim to the
purchased for $3,791, is illustrated in
Table 1. Column (3) of Table 1 contains
receipt at time t.
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6. The net value of the asset at each

the present value of each $1,000 receipt, discounted to time 0 (the beginning of period 1) at ten percent, while
column (4) computes the sum of the
present values of all remaining payments, first at time 0, and then as of
the end of each of periods 1 through 4.
The standard way of determining economic depreciation of this asset is to
compute the successive changes in the
values reported in column (4), which I

point in time is the difference between
columns (4) and (5), reported in column
(6). Economic depreciation now consists
of the successive changes in the entries
in column (6), and is reported in column
(7).

The actual computations of taxable income, tax, and after-tax cash flows are
reported in Table 2B, which replicates
Sunley's (1984) observation that economic depreciation again produces tax-

report in column (5). 8

invariant valuation. But there are some

The equivalent procedure implied by
equation 4 is to subtract from each periodic payment in column (2) the product
of (1) the asset's ten percent internal
rate of return and (2) its remaining value
as of the close of the preceding period,
as reported in the preceding line of column (4). The reader can easily verify that
this produces the same schedule of depreciation as the "standard" method.9 In
columns (6) through (8) I compute taxable income, tax, and after-tax cash flow
from the asset, and discount the latter

features to Tables 2A and 2B that merit

additional consideration. Note, first, that
the introduction of the final cost has re-

duced the present value of the combined stream of revenues and ex-

penses - and, presumably, the price an
investor would be willing to pay - from
$3,791 to $3,000. 10 Nevertheless, the

to time 0 at an after-tax discount rate of

seven percent, verifying that the asset
value is unaffected by the tax. The important thing to note, however, as sug-

gested by equation 5 and as the reader
can again easily verify, is that the
amount ultimately taxed to the holder is

depreciation properly allowable has increased. This is perhaps the most confusing, potentially misleading, and operationally perplexing aspect of the
treatment of future costs. A system of
depreciation geared to historical acquisition cost will have an unavoidably hard
time dealing with ("properly" depreciable) future costs.
Sunley (1984) himself explains the depreciation schedule with the observation

just the product of (1) the ten percent
that the asset's value declines from its
internal rate of return and (2) the asset's
$3,000 acquisition to -$1,401, producremaining value as of the close of the
ing $4,400 in allowable depreciation. As
preceding period.
with Table 1, however, the alternative
Tables 2A and 2B, which add to Table 1
account suggested by equation 4 is that
a $1,401 outlay to be made in period 6, the depreciation in each period consists
of the $1,000 receipt, reduced by the
replicate the actual example in Sunley
(1984). I have, however, explicitly deproduct of the internal rate of return
and the asset's value at the beginning of
composed the cash flows associated
with the asset into revenues and costs.
that period. In Table 2A, however, the
net value of the asset in each period [reThus, except for the addition of the
$1,401 outlay in period 6 in column (1), ported in column (6)] is, because of the
columns (1) through (4) of Table 2A are final cost, less than the corresponding
identical to Table 1, while column (5)
value reported in Table 1 . So the allowacomputes the value of the final cost, dis- ble depreciation has increased. In fact,
counted to the end of periods 0 through the depreciation schedule in Table 2A is
707

TABLE 2A

COMPUTATION OF ECONOMIC DEPRECIATION WITH FINAL COST

(4)b (5)c

X PV PV

(3)a (Revenue) (Cost)

(1) PV at at (6)d
Expense (Revenue) Period n Period n Net
(Initial (2) (at 10 (at 10 (at 10 Value at (7)e
Period Outlay) Revenue Percent) Percent) Percent) Period n Depreciation

Õ (3,000.00) 3,790.79 790.83 2,999.96

1 - 1,000.00 909.09 3,169.87 869.91 2,299.95 700.00
2 - 1,000.00 826.45 2,486.85 956.90 1,529.95 770.00

3 _ 1,000.00 751.31 1,735.54 1,052.59 682.95 847.00
4 - 1,000.00 683.01 909.09 1,157.85 -248.76 931.71

5 - 1,000.00 620.92 0.00 1,273.64 -1,273.64 1,024.88
6

1,401.00

-

1,401.00

-1401.00

127.36

aThe
pa
bThe
pr
the
fir
cThe
pr

6.

dColumn (4) - column (5).
eThe change from period n - 1 to period n in the present value of all remaining payments and expense, as given in
column (6).

TABLE 2B

COMPUTATION OF TAXABLE INCOME WITH FINAL COST USING ECONOMIC DEPRECIATION

(4)a

(5)
(7)
Tax (6)c PV

(1) (2) (3) Taxable (at 30 AT Cash (at 7
Period Revenue Expense Depreciation Income Percent) Flow Percent)
-

1
2
3
4

1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00

-

700.00
770.00
847.00
931.71

300.00
230.00
153.00
68.29

90.00
69.00
45.90
20.49

910.00
931.00
954.10
979.51

850.47
813.17
778.83
747.26

5 1,000.00 - 1,024.88 -24.88 -7.46 1,007.46 718.31
6 0.00 1,401.00 127.36 -127.36 -38.21 -1,362.79 -908.09

aColum
bColum
cColum
''The
am

simpl
(19
sched
lay
odic
c
and to those made at the close of its
final
useful life. In either event, deductions
(5)].11
for economic depreciation appear to
taxab
produce invariant asset valuation (albe
de
though we have not formally established
asset
that this will always be the case). That
umn
has not, however, served to quiet the
the
t
debate. For one thing, Samuelson's artias
im
cle is expressly about depreciation. AdTable
herents of cash-equivalent accounting
708
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expressly dispute its validity in the case
of outlays other than conventional "in-

V'(t) = yV(t) - R(t) + C(t).

vestments'' in durable goods, made in
advance of production. I will turn to
those concerns in the final section of the
paper.

Furthermore, even observers like Sunley
(1984), who subscribe to the analysis,
leave almost entirely unexplained (and,
indeed, unexplored) the means by which
to distinguish between (in Sunley's
words) "an investment expenditure that

The general formulation of the cost
function C(i) says nothing in particular
about whether, in conventional terms,
the costs are current or capital. Some
care must therefore be taken in deciding
how to rewrite equation 3. To allow the
solution to the problem to tell us just
what is deductible, regardless of

whether it is deductible as a current ex-

must be incurred in the future if income

pense or as depreciation, I define d(t,z)

is going to be earned currently," for
which depreciation is appropriate to begin with, and an ordinary and necessary
expenditure to operate an asset, for
which some different treatment presum-

to be the total amount deductible from

ably would be prescribed. In point of
fact, the entire distinction between future "current" and future capital outlays, here, as elsewhere, has introduced

the gross revenue stream, and rewrite
equation 3 as

m
'/(f,z) = ey(w" I {«(s) - C(s)
J s= t

z[R(s) - d(s,z)]} e~y{}~z)sds.

substantial confusion into the debate.

Direct marginal costs of current production are perhaps readily to be distinguished from an investment in the machine with which current output is

The partial derivative of equation 3a
with respect to time is

B

produced. But the issue is rarely that
simple.

dt

Costs, explicitly considered

= y(1 - z) V(t,z) - m
+ C(t) + zR(t) - zd(t,z).

In light of these considerations, it seems

natural to ask what happens in Samuelson's formulation when costs are explicitly introduced. To that end, define

As in Samuelson (1964), if equation 3a
is to be independent of z, that is, if we
are to have

m

V(t,z) = V(t, 0) = V(t),

m « fKt) - at)

where R(t) > 0 and C(t) > 0 are gross

then we can equate equation 2a and 7

revenues and costs, respectively, both
expressed as continuous functions of

to find that

time, and rewrite equation 1 as
d(t,z) = d(t)

B

= R(t) - yV(t)

V(t) = e"
I {/Ksi - Os)} e"** ds
Js=t

= -V'(t) + C(t).

the time derivative of which is

The tax-invariant depreciation schedule
709

in the reformulated problem appears to

capitalization rule. It offers some insight
into otherwise puzzling facts. Recall that
the intuition underlying Samuelson's depreciation schedule is that a receipt, formally includible in gross income, is ex-

differ in an important respect from

equation 4. Bearing in mind that, by
definition, V(t) = V(t), the last line of

equation 4a suggests that the revised
schedule exceeds the original schedule
by C(i), indicating that the costs at time
t, in addition to economic depreciation,
are properly allowable as deductions. In
fact, however, the appearance of gross
revenues in (4a) limits the extent to
which the costs may be deducted. To be
completely explicit (if somewhat redundant) about equation 4a, the amount

actly offset by a decline in the remaining
net income from the asset. Exactly the
same is true of current outlays. The outlay itself, although reducing the holder's
net worth, is exactly offset by a reduction in the holder's remaining payment

obligation, so that, once again, the net
consequence is a wash.12
The insight that conventionally current

deductible at t will be

expenditures have no impact on an
investor's net worth has exactly the
r N + C-yV, R> C
same flavor as the insight underlying the
d(f)=< R-yV, 0 </?<C
capitalization requirement itself. The exchange of, e.g., cash, for a durable
-yV, R = 0.
income-producing asset, does not affect
thecosts
purchaser's net worth, and it is for
Thus, if revenues exceed costs, the
that very reason that the outlay may not
are allowable as deductions. If, however,
be currently deducted. The similarity berevenues are less than costs, the amount
tween
the underlying insights suggests,
allowable is limited to revenues (reduced

in turn, that despite our instinctive beby the instantaneous accrual of yield). In
liefs that certain kinds of outlays are inshort, costs in excess of current gross
herently current while others are naturevenues are not deductible. They are,
rally
instead, to be accounted for through capital, the analysis exemplified by
Sunley (1984) is properly to be applied
depreciation.
to any current period expenditure in exAt first this may seem strange. But the
cess of current revenue, in any current
intuition again is relatively simple. In
period, regardless of whether the expenSamuelson's solution, depreciation is a
diture conventionally seems to be ordifunction of the change over time in the
nary and necessary or not. It thus has
value of the net revenue stream N(t). To
the virtue (at least in theory) of providthe extent that current expenses do not
ing a guide to determining when an
exceed current gross revenues, they can
income-producing expenditure is propbe applied to reduce gross revenue and
erly to be accounted for through depresubsumed into the depreciation schedule
ciation, regardless of whether it occurs
itself. To the extent, however, that curnear the beginning, in the middle or at
rent costs exceed current revenue, they
the end of an asset's productive life.
will - irrespective of whether they are
In fact, this generalized depreciation
conventionally capital or current - influ-

schedule can easily accommodate the

ence the change in the asset's value

initial (capitalized) investment in the as-

over a longer horizon than the current
period, and therefore should properly be
accounted for through depreciation.

set itself, which typically is treated in-

stead as a separate event, distinct from
the matter of depreciation. To see this,
assume that (1) /?( 0) = 0, (2) C(t) = 0

In a sense, this is a kind of "natural"
710

I TAX POLICY AND THE ENVIRONMENT

and R(t) = N(t) for 0 < t < T, and (3)

which I turn to those not anticipated in

set C0 = ~V(0) (determined without regard for C0). "Cost" now consists solely
of a time 0 outlay equal to the present

advance.
FUTURE ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS

value of the entire net revenue stream,

Advocates of accrual accounting for future costs have frequently appealed to
tax-rate invariance as the standard by
which different methodologies are to be
judged. As a casual matter, it is hard to
imagine that tax-rate invariance could be
judged desirable with respect to investments in conventionally capitalized depreciable assets but not with respect to
future costs. One virtue of the analysis
above is that, as a formal matter, it justifies those appeals.

so that overall this is a zero-net present
value investment. Now, in accordance
with equation 4a, the amount deductible in connection with the initial outlay
is

-yV( 0) = 0

since R( 0) = V(0) = 0. Thus, the natural
capitalization rule replicates conventional
capitalization of an investment made in
advance.

In practice, however, the implications of
this analysis will not be quite as radical
as at first they might appear. Both Sam-

uelson's analysis and the modest elaboration offered here assume that revenues and expenses are known with
certainty in advance. Outlays that are directly related to current production (and
conventionally regarded as deductible) in
excess of current revenues will typically

Anticipated Costs
In principle
As an illustration, we can justify formally

the treatment of the example in Tables
2A and 2B. To do so, assume first that
the asset can be described by eqution 1,
with pretax value V(t), and then add the
following assumptions:

r N(t), 0 < f < T
be contemplated in advance only by a
/?(f) =
lR(t) > 0, t=T
producer who plans on pricing below
marginal cost, or, given the absence of
f 0, 0 < f < T
uncertainty, otherwise engaging in sub=
'
optimal conduct like unnecessarily stocklcr>/?(7")>0, t=T.
piling raw materials in advance. With no
uncertainty, it is therefore reasonable to
Thus, gross revenues are simply equal to
expect that the relationship between
net revenues, except for a single expenrevenues and costs that determines
diture (for remediation) made at time T.
whether, in the analysis above, an outlay
CT > R(T) > 0 implies that the (pretax)
is to be depreciated, will conform to
value of the asset, taking account of the
conventional understandings of whether
remediation expense, is
it is capital or current. If, however, some
originally unanticipated outlay becomes
na
necessary, as when a producer discovers
only ex post that its activities have been
causing environmental degradation,
V(t) = e* II N(s)e'ys ds - e~yT Crj
modifications to the basic analysis may
< V(t).
be required. In the balance of the paper,
then, I go on to illustrate the application
of the analysis to anticipated costs, after The tax-invariant depreciation schedule
711

that is hard to reconcile with an income

for equation 1 b, the negative of its time
derivative, or

tax.

been allowable in the absence of the fi-

To pursue this, I assume that the investor in the asset described by equation
1 b operates in an economic environment
such that she can increase her prices so
as to raise additional revenues having an
aggregate pretax present value equal to
the required final payment CT. Specifically, I assume that the additional revenues are described by some continuous
function f(t) > 0, defined on 0 < í <

nal payment CT by

T, satisfying

ye*-" CTl

□

gg
N(t) - yV(t)
has the same form as Samuelson's de-

preciation schedule (equation 4). But
V(t) < V(t) implies that the amount allowable as depreciation at time t exceeds the depreciation that would have

f(s) e"*5 ds = e'yT CT.

the instantaneous increase at time t in

Js= 0

the present value of Cr.13

With hesitation, I suggest thinking of

Each conclusion conforms to what we

observed in Table 2. The pretax present
value of the asset declined; total depreciation increased; and the amount by
which depreciation in each period increased equaled the change in the present value of the final $1,401 payment
(CT).

f(t) as generating a ''fund" dedicated to
satisfying CT.14 As so considered, it is

clear that the value of the original asset,
freed of the burden of satisfying the fi-

nal payment, would once again be given
by V(t) [rather than V(t) < V(t)], and depreciation of the asset itself could, once
again, be geared to its historical cost.

Economic depreciation and cashequivalent accounting

The important question is how to ac-

A second virtue of the analysis is that it
can be used to pinpoint more precisely
the difference between economic depre-

equivalent accounting, such as Fiekowsky (1984), would claim that I have
already misspecified the problem. They

count for the fund. Advocates of cash-

ciation and cash-equivalent accounting

assert that the additional revenues col-

for future costs. For, despite all the legislation enacted in 1984, there remain

lected to meet the final payment should
be defined by the assumption that,
when reduced to present value using an
after-tax discount rate, they equal the
present value of CT. Formally, the required revenues should be given by
some other function g(t) satisfying

serious differences of opinion about
what is theoretically correct. We can,

however, use the analysis above to shed
light on just why it is that economic depreciation, elsewhere so widely regarded
as theoretically appropriate, has been so
vehemently resisted in the case of future
costs. In fact, Samuelson's analysis can
in principle be applied to future costs.
But the tax-invariant depreciation schedule turns out to require (at least apparently) a zero rate of tax, a conclusion

EM
f g(s) e"y(1_z)s ds = CT€~y(1~z)r.

J 5=0

With those assumptions, and the addi712
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find a stream of deductions that will

tional assumption that the final payment
itself would be deductible when made, it

render it tax invariant.

follows automatically that consistency is
achieved only if (1) the revenues "con-

But we can be more specific. Using the
properties of the integral and equation
when contributed, but (2) the fund itself 8, equation 9 can be rewritten as
is taxed. That is because, by definition,

tributed" to the fund are deductible

ey(w)r Í (1 - z) g{s) e'*'-* ds

e '[{/ Hs)e^ds ~ I f(s)e_y,cb}

J 5= 0

= e*w)r(1 - z) Cj€~y0~z)T

- e-'rCr]

= (1 - z)CT.

= - e* f f(s) e~ysds .

That treatment, however, sacrifices the

Js = 0

Samuelson property: the additional revenue required to fund the final liability
will increase with a producer's marginal
rate of tax, as can easily be seen by differentiating either side of equation 8a
with respect to z. So if, for example, the
ability to raise prices to provide for the
final liability were to be constrained by
competition, those taxed at lower marginal rates would be better situated to

What equation 9a says is that the

do so.

The revenues raised to provide for the final payment CT can, alternatively, be
taxed so as to make them tax invariant.

amounts already received [ f(t)] from
time 0 to any time f, together with accumulated interest, will be just sufficient
to offset the amount by which the present value of the final liability exceeds the
present value of the revenues yet to be
received. In the abstract, this really is a
representation of a fund, held to satisfy
the final payment Cr. It then follows
from Samuelson's original derivation that
the amount deductible from the reve-

nues f(t) to insure invariant valuation of
the fund is given by

To derive the solution, let the present
value at time t of the remaining stream hem
of receipts, net of the present value of
-F(f) = f(t) - yF(t) > f(t) > 0
the final payment CT, be given by

S

since F(t) < 0.

F(t) = e * IJT f(s) e~ys ds - e~yT Crj.

interest. It says, formally, that invariant

Expression 10 is of more than passing
valuation of a fund, held to satisfy a future liability, can be achieved in the
presence of an income tax, but if (and
only if) the investor is permitted to deduct the sum of (1) the revenues re-

Note, first, that by reason of equation 8,
F(0) = 0, and, second, that as time
passes, the value of the remaining
stream of receipts declines, whereas the
present value of the final payment
grows, so that F(t) < 0 for t > 0. Finally, since equation 9 has the same
form as equation 1b, we can expect to

ceived to fund the liability, plus (2) the
interest accruing on the accumulated

fund.15 Suppose, then, we were to
imagine funds being "set aside" to satisfy a future cost, and suppose also that
713

we were to assume that both contribu-

Unanticipated Expenses

tions to the fund and earnings from investing those contributions were to be What, at this juncture it might reasonbe inquired, does any of this have
taxed, subject only to the allowance of ably
a
to do with Technical Advice Memoranda
deduction sufficient to preserve tax-

invariance. According to equation 10, Numbers 9240004 and 9315004, or, for
that matter, with the decisions in Inthe required deduction would equal the
fund's entire gross income, producing dopco v. Comm'r 17 and Plain field Union
(at least apparently) a zero rate of tax. Water Company,™ often mentioned in
That is, a zero rate of tax, and only a connection with those rulings? Perhaps
zero rate of tax, can insure invariant val-not a lot. But possibly not nothing.
uation of a fund held to satisfy a future

The general flavor of what I have called
a natural approach to capitalization, outlined in the preceding section, certainly
This finding serves to explain why those
who have searched for ''neutral" means
suggests that expenditures that are large
by which to tax future costs have so fre-by comparison with current revenues are

cost.

quently produced solutions that seem tolikely to influence the value of an activity
entail a zero rate of tax. Expression 10 over time that extends beyond the pesuggests that this feature will be exhib- riod in which they are actually incurred.
ited by any tax-rate invariant solution toViewed from that perspective, and otherwise considered in a vacuum, many of
the problem of future costs.16 It also
the expenditures currently in controversy
helps to explain why this problem has so
sharply divided a distinguished and dis- seem to share that characteristic. "Repassionate group of analysts, many of medial" removal of PCBs or asbestos
them committed to an income tax. To

may not strike everyone as "bettering"
the land or the machines, but, by comcounting, it simply must be that earnings parison with those same assets in contaminated form, their long-term net proon assets held to satisfy a future cost
ductivity would reasonably seem to be
are taxed, and that revenues must be
"set aside" to satisfy the liability on that enhanced. The same might plausibly be
assumption. However, it generally is not said of the cement linings added to
the case that producers taxed at differ- Plainfield Union Water's pipes. Arguent rates will be free to charge different ments to the contrary seem strained,
prices for their products, and for a given and I do not find it surprising that such
amount of revenue, cash-equivalent so- considerations influenced the Service's,
and may influence the Treasury's,
lutions generally will not be tax invari-

those who advocate cash-equivalent ac-

ant. For advocates of economic depreciation (or "neutrality," by any name),
on the other hand, tax-invariant solutions are available, but they seem to entail taxation of producers that is not easily reconciled with an "income" tax.
Expression 10 suggests that this will always be the case. Thus, the analysis developed here more clearly outlines the
implications of the two basic alternatives
identified in the introduction to this paper.

stance.

At the same time, the theoretical treat-

ment of costs outlined in the preceding
section is theoretically appropriate only
to the valuation of streams of revenue
(or expense) known with certainty in advance. In addition, for two somewhat
different reasons, the analysis above may
actually imply a different treatment for

the unanticipated outlays considered
here. If, first, one subscribes to cashequivalent accounting for future costs, a
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natural implication would seem to be
that if, instead of having been anticipated in advance, the costs first become
known when they must actually be paid,
they should be deductible at that time.

to see that the belated discovery of
some environmental contaminant, and
the (costly) need for its removal, depresses the value of the contaminated

At least some adherents to the cash-

equivalence position seem to be of just
that view. On the other hand, most of

asset, thereby inflicting a loss on its
holder. If those losses were deductible, I

suspect that the arguments now being
made on behalf of the ordinary and necessary character of rather substantial re-

the outlays with respect to which specific legislation was enacted in 1984
medial outlays, that unambiguously afwere associated with the close of a projfect the value and long-term productivity
ect's service life, so that at worst they
of the assets to which they relate, would
should have been deductible at that
strike a great deal many more people as
time. In contrast, many of the items curstrained.
rently in controversy are associated with
ongoing projects, leaving open the pos-Standing alone, however, such losses
sibility that they may in part relate to fuobviously are not deductible. In short, a
ture productivity, in which even conven-major underlying problem here is the retional analysis would suggest that they alization requirement itself. And, perbe capitalized in part.
haps, the soundest structural (as op-

Suppose, however, that one subscribes posed to economic) argument to be
(at least in principle) to using economic made for currently deducting the costs
depreciation to account for future costs. of environmental restoration is simply
Although not immediately obvious, the that they are made to offset the consequences of an unrealized and otherwise
analysis of the preceding section indicates that, when accounted for using
nondeductible loss.20 Under a pure aceconomic depreciation, a future cost af-crual tax, the losses, but not the costs of
fects the aggregate stream of allowable restoration, would generally be deductdeductions only up until the point that itible. Permitting a deduction for the costs
actually is paid. In other words, with
of restoration roughly replicates that reeconomic depreciation, an anticipated sult. That is the most sensible interpretacost will already have been deducted bytion of the Plainfield Union Water case.
the time that it is paid. The unambiguThat, in fact, was precisely the effect of
ous implication is that costs that materthe Court's comparing the value of the
ialize ex post should be allowed as a depipes after restoration with their value
duction when they are paid.19
before the tuberculation first appeared.
There is yet another way of looking at
I do not claim the argument to be deciremediation expenses like those in Techsive. In particular instances its application
nical Advice Memoranda Numbers
may be unwarranted, as where an ap9240004 and 9315004. The removal of
parent
loss is more illusory than real.21
the asbestos or the PCBs may very well
More generally, it would, if accepted,
have enhanced the value of those assets
tend increasingly to make the realization
if compared to just before the removal
requirement a "one-way" street. All the
was undertaken , but the same cannot
be said if the comparison is to the self- same, the allowance for depreciation is
same assets before the contaminants (or itself a sizable exception to the realizathe need for their removal) were first
tion rule. So, as this argument would in
discovered. It requires no formal analysis many instances just substitute one ex715

amortized conventional mortgage loan. See
Chirelstein (1994), Section 6.08 (of). In the lat-

ception to the realization requirement
for another, perhaps it deserves to be
seriously considered.22

ter instance, it is familiar, of course, that the
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1 Some will object to the implications of this
terminology, which I adopt in the interests of
convenience. Actually, any stream of deductions with the property that their aggregate
present values, consistently computed using
an after-tax discount rate, just equals the future outlay, should produce what I have

called a cash-equivalent outcome. Compare
Bailey (1974). Devotees of this approach include, in particular, Fiekowsky (1984) and
Cunningham (1985), as well as current Sections 468 and 468A.
2 A useful summary can be found in Cunningham (1985), who, however, disagrees

"proper" amount to be includable in the income of the lender (the "investor") is just the
product of the outstanding "principal balance" and the instrument's "yield-tomaturity," as now provided for in I.R.C. Section 1272(a). That is precisely what equation
5 produces in the way of taxable income to
the holder of an asset subject to economic
depreciation. It is somewhat more realistic to
expect that we can achieve approximately accurate accrual taxation of debt than that we
can of depreciable assets. For a careful study

of the application of Samuelson's (1964)
theorem to depreciation when revenue profiles are known only statistically in advance,
and of the difficulties in making the theorem
operational when uncertainty is introduced,
see Strnad (1991).
8 E.g., Chirelstein (1994) Section 6.08(d), and
Sunley (1984).
9 For example, in period 1, depreciation, would

be $1,000 - (0.1 X $3,790.79) = $620.92,

as actually reported in column (5) for
period 1.

with them all.

10 It is, of course, unlikely that a simple repro-

3 See generally Aidinoff and Lopata (1980);
Sunley (1984); Kiefer (1984); Kiefer (1985);
Halperin (1984); Halperin (1986); Klein
(1987); and Halperin and Klein (1988).

ducible asset in a market economy would sell
for both $3,000 and $3,791, depending on

4 Section 461(h) largely dictates "cash." Sections 468 and 468A, although appearing to
allow some form of advance accrual, actually
operate to allow deductions whose aggregate
present values, computed using an after-tax
discount rate, are equal to the present value
of a deduction for the expenses when they
are actually paid. See note 1 .
5 This, essentially, is the sort of cost required to
be capitalized in Technical Advice Memoran-

dum Number 9315004; removing asbestos insulation from existing machinery was somewhat similarly required to be capitalized by

whether it was acquired for a project with or
without the future cost. An alternative way of
looking at this example would be that, without the final cost, an investor requiring a pretax rate of return of ten percent would pay
$3,000 for the asset even if it produced annual revenue of only $791; whereas, with the
final cost, she would pay $3,000 only if the
project produced annual revenue of $1,000.
11 For example, in period 1, the present value of
the liability grows from $790.83 to $869.91,

or by $79.08, which, when added to the
$620.92 of period 1 depreciation reported in
Table 1, produces total depreciation of $300.

12 It should be kept in mind at this juncture
that, by hypothesis, both R(t) and C(t) are
known in advance. As discussed in the next
6 To avoid unnecessary haggling about equilib- section, somewhat different considerations
rium interest rates, I do not here assume the
arise with respect to unanticipated costs.
existence of any hypothetical "no-tax" world.
13 Aggregate additional depreciation just equals
Expression 1 can simply be interpreted as the
value of the asset to a tax-exempt investor in the change in the present value of CT between 0 and T. It can be obtained by intea taxable environment.
grating the expression in the text from 0 to T,
7 This is just a generalization of the more familand is given by
iar observation that, for an asset with con(1 - e yT)CT.
stant productivity (a "one-hoss shay"), economic depreciation produces a pattern of
asset depreciation identical to the schedule 14
ofAlternatively, one could imagine the investor
principal amortization for a level-payment fullyas dedicating a portion of the original reveTechnical Advice Memorandum Number
9240004.
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17 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992).
18 39 T.C. 33 (1962).

nue stream R(t) to satisfying that liability, but
the result would be equivalent and the effects
somewhat more difficult to disentangle.

19 Unless the firm is able to increase revenues to

cover the unanticipated costs. See endnote

15 In technical terms, the difference between

21.

this particular version of Samuelson's (1964)
depreciation and others is that the formal
"value" of the fund is negative, so that interest accruing on the fund's value at time t,
given by yF{t), is added to, rather than sub-

20 The conclusion that, under an accrual tax,
such losses ought to be deductible is simply
an application of the insight, to be found in
Strnad (1991), that an integral feature of a
system of economic depreciation is that the
previously unrecovered cost of an asset
should be immediately deductible if the asset
is prematurely retired. That insight suggests
that if unanticipated environmental costs lead
to the retirement of an investment, the ad-

tracted from, the time t receipt in determin-

ing the total amount allowable as a deduc-

tion.

16 In particular, if the investor were to receive a
single payment at time 0, equal to the pretax
present value of CT, the analysis suggests that
the initial receipt should be deducted (or,
equivalently, excluded) and expression 10 says
that the investor thereafter should be allowed
to deduct

justed basis of the investment and the remediation costs themselves should be deductible
at that time.

21 This might very well be the case where a producer found to have created environmental

contamination operated in an economic envi-

-yF(t) = ye^Q

ronment that permitted it effectively to recover the costs of restoration from the purchasers of its goods. I am grateful to Daniel
Halperin for suggesting this point.

the accrual of yield at time t on the amount
initially received. This is the case, studied in
detail by Aidinoff and Lopata (1980), Halperin
(1986), and more recently by Halperin and
Klein (1988), in which the single payment received to fund the future liability is analogized

22 And so, not long after this paper was first

presented, it was. See Rev. Rul. 94-38,
1994-25 I.R.B. (June 20, 1994).
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